Showing posts with label Francine McKenna. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Francine McKenna. Show all posts

Monday, January 9, 2012

Forbes Follows Up on EPJ Report on Suspicious MF Global Filing Practices

Following up on the report of EPJ's Bob English on suspicious filing practices surrounding MF Global documents, Francine McKenna comments at Forbes:
Instead of looking out for MF Global investors – and customers who are still waiting for their money – it looks like regulators and the bankruptcy trustees are busy suppressing information. Instead of full transparency, regulators and the trustees are holding onto crucial details that might tell us all who was asleep at the wheel when the broker/dealer and futures commission merchant (FCM) headed over the cliff.

Bob English, an independent trader and contributing editor to the blog, Economic Policy Journal, published a post this morning that raises serious questions about the Securities and Exchange Commission’s program of regulation for broker/dealers and, in particular, the agency’s role in keeping the truth from the public about what went wrong at MF Global.
McKenna continues:
PwC’s report to the SEC of internal control discrepancies for 2010, and there is one according to the filing index, is private. None of the auditor’s reports specific to the broker/dealer and FCM are available to the public on Edgar for 2011.

Is this just sloppy scanning? It’s no coincidence to me that auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers may also be playing a role in keeping uncomfortable or incriminating information from the public about its audit clients which include MF Global as well as Bank of America, JP Morgan, and Barclays. (See latest record fine against PwC for looking the other way at customer funds commingling at JP Morgan. They are also under investigation for similar sins at Barclays.) The largest audit firms routinely request confidential treatment of their reports and contract details such as engagement partners, whether as a vendor to the government or as a defendant in a contentious lawsuit.

There’s also a very strong interest on all sides of the MF Global mess in not leading anyone to third-parties such as bankers like JP Morgan, lawyers, and PwC, the auditors, too soon. Is there something in PwC’s secret audit reports and internal controls discrepancy reports for the broker/dealer for 2010 and perhaps 2011, that someone, anyone should have paid attention to earlier?

Here we are, more than two months after the forced liquidation of the MF Global broker dealer - it’s important to note this was no voluntary bankruptcy filing but a liquidation forced on MF Global by the Securities Investor Protection Corp – and the missing $1.2 billion of customer funds has not yet shown up...

When the trustees, the regulators, and the FBI finally stop looking under sofa cushions for the missing customer funds, they’ll have to start preparing lawsuits against third-parties to meet the huge shortfall including directors, JP Morgan, Jeffries, who underwrote the bond issue in August, and auditor PwC.

The Department of Justice will be forced to file criminal charges against someone.

What evidence will they base these lawsuits and criminal complaints on? Typically, a bankruptcy trustee hires a bankruptcy examiner to develop the theories and uncover the evidence used to hold executives, directors, bankers, underwriters, auditors and attorneys responsible for the failure of the firm and any fraud.

That hasn’t happened here. Why not?

Monday, December 12, 2011

Is Your Money Safe at Merrill Lynch and Fidelity?

The MF Global debacle has clearly shaken people up. Despite devoting one major post to the safety of investment accounts, I continue to receive email questions about the safety of specific firms including Merrill Lynch and Fidelity.

As a follow up to my initial post, here are a few thoughts.

Is your money safe at Merrill Lynch and Fidelity? Most likely, yes.

BUT, I would have said the same thing about the commodity brokerage firm Lind-Walldack, which was owned by MF Global and where client accounts are now frozen.

The blow up of MF Global is not an unusual event. Many hedge funds have blown up in recent years (e.g. Long Term Capital Managemnet), and brokerage firms have blown up (e.g. Lehman Brothers), but it is rare for supposedly segregated funds do be involved in such blow ups.

In the case of hedge funds, they usually don't own brokerage firms. In the case, of brokerage firms, they usually don't dip into segregated funds because that is a major violation (read: jail time). You need someone pretty desperate and not thinking very clearly do so.

Francine McKenna reports at Forbes:
The CME conducted an audit of segregated funds on October 24. According to several published accounts, this review was completed that same day. At that time, the CME says, “MF Global was in compliance with its segregation requirements.”...On October 27, Thursday, as a result of the earnings call, Moody’s reduced MF Global two more steps to Ba2 and put it under review for more possible cuts. Bloomberg reported that the company had exhausted all of its credit lines the night before.
This is most likely when the real desperation kicked in. Bankruptcy should have been filed right then, but instead, a decision was likely made to use client segregated assets to meet margin calls, insanely hoping that markets would turnaround in a day or two and the assets would be put back in client accounts without any clients aware of the major violation that had occurred, or perhaps hope it would buy time to sell the firm.

McKenna describes a very strong plausible theory on how the thinking would have gone down, if Corzine was hoping to sell the firm:
I’ve given those who executed the “nuclear option” to save MF Global the benefit of the doubt. I believe those executives used all available legitimate means to raise cash first, including trying to sell proprietary assets, as CNBC reported, and exhausting existing credit lines. When margin calls on the repurchase agreements and account closure demands from strategically important clients – not the bread and butter individual traders and smaller investors and money managers who got rubber checks – kept coming, they hit the wall.

Why do I believe MF Global executives transferred customer assets not cash to “house” accounts? Because missing cash would be noticed immediately. Their clients were still trading and clearing and cash was required to settle. Securities such as U.S. Treasury Bills, blue-chip equities such as CME Group stock held by many exchange members, and physical assets such as gold, warehouse receipts, and other certificates of title are less active. They would not be missed Thursday through Monday.

What did MF Global do once these assets were moved to a “house” account? I believe they pledged the customer assets as collateral for a short term loan...Corzine planned to sell the company not file bankruptcy.

There was no time to monetize the assets by selling them outright. That would have made replacing them quickly, in kind, much more difficult. A privately arranged line of credit, secured by a basket of assets discounted by up to 50% due to the risk of default and the firm’s desperation, could be unwound as soon as a deal to sell the firm was struck. All the assets could go back into the customer accounts and no one would be the wiser.

Any firm willing to lend $300-400 million for a week or so against approximately $700 million of customer assets was certainly wise enough to require recourse to those assets in the event of a bankruptcy. Some of the assets, like CME stock, were sure to drop in value if the bankruptcy occurred.

When MF Global filed for bankruptcy midday on Monday October 31, 2011, the lender owned the customer assets.

My guess is the pledged assets were immediately liquidated.
In other words, this was a situation that developed over a very short-term period that an outside accounting firm would have little chance of catching.

Could this type of thing happen at Fidelity or Merrill Lynch?  Very unlikely. Fidelity is an entirely different operation with no leveraged hedge fund activities that I am aware of. Merrill Lynch is owned by Bank of America, a bank that seemingly is considered TBTF by the government, This probably also means Merrill.

That said, we live in very unusual economic times. It's hard to see how Fidelity or Merrill would get themselves into such a desperate financial situation with desperate man at the top making very desperate decisions , but it can't be ruled out. The best thing, as I pointed out in my first post on this topic, is to diversify your assets over many different firms, and where possible take delivery of certificates, gold and cash.