Showing posts with label GregMankiw. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GregMankiw. Show all posts

Saturday, April 10, 2010

Finally, Greg Mankiw Grows Some Balls...

Well, at least he links to someone who has some. Here's what is going on.

Recently, I took Harvard's Greg Mankiw to task for couching the Obamacare debate as simply a budget problem. I wrote:
Mankiw throws in the words libertarian versus communitarian, but couches most of his critique in terms of the fiscal problems. True enough, the fiscal problems will be gigantic, but what exactly Mankiw "understands" from proponents of the bill is a little hard to see.

This is far more than a fiscal problem. It is about creating disincentives for innovation in medicine. It is about price controls that will limit service. It is about government decision making on diagnosis and treatments--influenced by lobbyists. It will limit quality care, create unwanted care. It will eat away at life expectancy. This is basic stuff that Mankiw, as an economist, should understand.

There is really something disturbingly wrong with an economist such as Mankiw couching it in terms of simply a debate on the budget consequences of the bill, and to soft pedal the other major problems.
Today, at his blog, Mankiw links to a column by James C. Capretta, Fellow at Ethics and Public Policy Center, who takes the the case one step closer to the understanding that Obamacare is going to be about limited service and eventual declining life expectancy in the U.S. Here's Capretta:

Now that the year-long debate in Congress over health care legislation has come to a close, it’s reasonable to ask: What’s next?

Some think that enactment will quickly lead to widespread and generally quiet acquiescence to the terms of the new law, even by those who were strongly against its passage by Congress. Perhaps.

But most of the law’s major provisions don’t get implemented until 2014. Indeed, though President Barack Obama is now daring his adversaries to try to repeal the law’s protections and benefits, hardly anyone will see benefits for more than three years. In the meantime, there will be two federal election cycles and plenty of Medicare cuts, tax increases, and insurance premium hikes to inflame passions.

Moreover, the manner by which the legislation was enacted virtually guarantees that the mid-term election this November, as well as the presidential contest in 2012, will become de facto referenda on the health care plan. Put another way, the last words in this debate were not uttered at the law’s signing ceremony. Those will be reserved for the voters, when they make their voices heard at the ballot box...

But, assuming for the moment that implementation proceeds as scheduled, what will the future hold?

The president himself has said that the national plan contains many of the features of the Massachusetts program, now operating in its third year. He is right. There are striking similarities between the reform plans, which is why what’s happening in Massachusetts today is very instructive.

When Massachusetts rolled out its coverage program in 2007, many more people signed up for the new heavily subsidized insurance than was originally predicted by budget officials. Almost immediately, costs far exceeded what had been budgeted, forcing state officials to scramble to find cuts elsewhere in government and other sources of revenue.

After three years, no real progress has been made on rising costs. The program remains well over budget, with no end in sight. Further, state residents who now must buy state-sanctioned coverage are bristling at their rising premiums and the inability to find coverage which covers less and thus costs less.

State politicians are responding to the cost crisis the only way they know how: by promising to impose arbitrary caps on premiums and price controls for medical services. The governor and state regulators have disallowed 90 percent of the premium increases insurers --all of whom are not-for-profit--submitted for their enrollees for the upcoming plan year. The state says premium increases above eight percent are too high and unacceptable, though they themselves don’t have a plan to make health care more efficient in Massachusetts. They just want lower premiums. The insurers have responded by refusing to sell any coverage at the rates the state wants to impose.

The way out of this stand-off is predictable: more price controls. To hold premiums down, Massachusetts officials are already laying the groundwork to impose government-set payment rate schedules for services beyond the realm of public insurance.

The risk of cost overruns is even higher at the federal level than in Massachusetts. The Congressional Budget Office projects just 17 million people will be getting subsidized insurance through the state-based exchanges in 2016. But the population with incomes between 100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty line--roughly the group targeted for subsidized coverage--is more like 130 million people. CBO assumes the vast majority of low- and moderate-wage families will stay in job-based plans with no additional federal help. But what if they are wrong? Employers are already looking for ways to shed as much of their health care bill as they possibly can onto taxpayers. If 30 or even 50 million Americans end up in the exchanges, federal costs will soar.

The federal government is already running up debt at an unprecedented pace even before the new health care entitlement has been rolled out. If the health bill’s costs exceed projections, the same pressures which have led Massachusetts officials to impose premium caps and price controls as the solution to costs would lead some politicians at the federal level to call for the same approach nationwide. Indeed, the administration has already laid the predicate for just such steps with its proposal to establish a federal insurance rate authority to oversee insurers’ premium submissions. That idea did not make the final legislative cut, but it could easily be resurrected in a budget crisis.

And that’s the real danger of what’s just been enacted. There are only two ways to slow the pace of rising costs: with a functioning marketplace or with government-imposed cost controls. The new health law adopted neither approach in any significant way. But when push comes to shove, it’s clear which direction the Obama administration will go to really slow the pace of rising costs, which is the same direction Massachusetts is already heading today--toward heavy-handed price controls. Such controls, however, do not make health care delivery more efficient. They cut costs only by driving out willing suppliers of services. In other words, it’s cost control through restricted access to care.
Got that, "restricted access"? Restricted access means only one thing, less care, more pain, more inconvenience and falling life expectancy.

Sunday, April 4, 2010

Meet a "Statistical Illusion"

Iris Mack emails a link to an NYT Op-Ed from Michael J Burry, who made a fortune selling short sub-prime mortgages.

In the Op-Ed, which is an important read, he points out that his insights, that caused him to short the subprime sector, are being labeled  a “statistical illusion” by Alan Greenspan

Let me get this straight, somehow those like Greenspan and Greg Mankiw, who didn't see the subprime crash coming in the first place are now experts on why those who did see it were just statistical illusions?
Mack says because of Greenspan's comment she is not reading anymore news today since it is ruining her Easter.

Monday, January 25, 2010

A Cry for Help From Larry Summers?

Bob Murphy points me to a curious blog post by Greg Mankiw. In the post, Mankiw tells us that he has received an email from:
One of my many friends working for President Obama...
The gist of the email is that what is going on inside the White House, versus outside views, are two totally different things, but that outside views have taken on a momentum of their own and may result in dumping two very good men, Larry Summers and Timothy Geithner.

Hmm, I wonder who Mankiw knows in the Obama Administration that is concerned with the careers of Summers and Geithner? Say didn't that guy Summers, for a bit, run Harvard University where Mankiw teaches?

Here's some of what Mankiw's "inside friend" wrote to Mankiw:
My perspective here has given me an unusual window into the looking-glass mirror of how things I see on the inside are interpreted on the outside.

The most vivid case in point is the recent policy announcements about implementing the Volcker ideas about separating investment and commercial banking.

This policy process has been in the works for months, and it came to fruition in the normal course of policy operations after extensive meetings and consultations among Treasury, NEC, the PERAB board, and other parties...

Wall Street is interpreting this as "Summers, Geithner, and Bernanke are on the way out because Obama has finally decided to go populist." Honestly, that is truly not right, though I can see how from the outside it would look like it.

Oddly enough, this is one of those cases where the whole thing could be a self-fulfilling prophecy....

PS I know it's a fool's game to try to explain moves in the stock market, but I have a friend on Wall Street who tells me that the selloff in the last couple of days is more due to uncertainty caused by the sense that Summers and Geithner are losing out to populism than to specifics of the bank plan.
Mankiw closes by thanking Summers, er ah, his "inside friend":
Thanks for helping to get the true story out.
Actually, there is some truth to the comment that there is fear on Wall Street that Summers and Geithner may lose out to populism. The thinking is pretty much that Obama is a commie and that, although Summers and Geithner are bought and paid for by Goldman Sachs and haven't been much help to anyonelse on the Street, if they are gone, things will deteriorate for markets real fast.

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

Krugman versus Mankiw (Vegas "Whales Table" Edition)

Harvard economist Greg Mankiw has challenged the Obama Administration's forecast that real GDP in 2013 will be 15.6 percent above real GDP in 2008.

NYT columnist, and winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, Paul Krugman, in a recent blog post, challenges Mankiw's use of unit root in his argument and further challenges Mankiw's overall attack on the Administration's forecast. The post is titled, Roots of evil (Wonkish).

Mankiw has obviously taken offense to Krugman's use of the headline Roots of evil,and writes:

Paul Krugman suggests that my skepticism about the administration's growth forecast over the next few years is somehow "evil."
Then Mankiw, who probably makes enough in royalties as best selling text book author to handle the next AIG bailout round all by himself, pulls out his wallet, and puts this challenge to Krugman:

Well, Paul, if you are so confident in this forecast, would you like to place a wager on it and take advantage of my wickedness?

Team Obama says that real GDP in 2013 will be 15.6 percent above real GDP in 2008. (That number comes from compounding their predicted growth rates for these five years.) So, Paul, are you willing to wager that the economy will meet or exceed this benchmark? I am not much of a gambler, but that is a bet I would be happy to take the other side of (even as I hope to lose, for the sake of the economy).
I hasten to add that the title of Mankiw's post is, Wanna bet some of that Nobel money?

Actually, this is just a slightly different version of the Murphy-Wenzel wager--We haven't won our Nobel Prizes, yet (The Committee is obviously taking care of the old guys first)--so we are keeping the wager a bit more manageable until we get the calls.

But, since Krugman has gotten the call, my advice to him is go "all in" versus Mankiw. He should lay down the roughly $1,098,000 of  Nobel award money, and bet. Obviously, he doesn't believe in Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT), but I find myself on the same side of the debate as Krugman versus Murphy and Mankiw. ABCT will put him over the top, given the astounding money printing that Fed chairman Bernanke is orchestrating, IF it continues. We have nothing to fear, Paul, as long as Bernanke keeps up the printing. I say, "let it ride."


Saturday, February 14, 2009

Mankiw Weighs In On Obama's Economic Team

Econ textbook dollar leader, Greg Mankiw, (His books sell for over $100 and are the most popular texts used at the college level, you figure out how many millions he is raking in.) explains Obama's econ team to Nina Easton at Business Week:


Team Obama doesn't mind leaving critics on the roadside because of an über-confidence that the facts are on their side. Goolsbee, an economist who has been at Obama's side since day one of the campaign, likes to call the economic team "data dogs" who bring post-partisanship to policymaking because they are driven by evidence rather than ideology. But Greg Mankiw, the Harvard economist who chaired Bush's CEA for two years - and who counts many of Obama's picks as friends - offers a more politically charged label: Keynesians, after the British economist who championed interventionist policy. "They are extremely committed Keynesians," he says. "I hope they show the requisite humility that not all economists share their view."
Nice comment for a mainstream guy, not too harsh, but gets the point across.

As for the Obama Econ Team being "data dogs", puhleeze. Think Geithner's bailout presentation for what is really going on at this White House.

Friday, January 23, 2009

Mankiw On the Decision Making Apparatus at the White House

Greg Mankiw is tougher on a Joe Biden statement than even I would be. I'd dissmiss it as Biden just blowing smoke. But, Mankiw has worked for an occupant of the White House before, and I haven't, so maybe he sees something I don't. Here's Mankiw:

In a TV interview last month, Vice President Joe Biden said

Every economist, as I've said, from conservative to liberal, acknowledges that direct government spending on a direct program now is the best way to infuse economic growth and create jobs.

That statement is clearly false.

As I have documented on this blog in recent weeks, skeptics about a spending stimulus include quite a few well-known economists, such as (in alphabetical
order)Alberto Alesina, Robert Barro, Gary Becker, John Cochrane,Eugene Fama, Robert Lucas, GregMankiw, Kevin Murphy, Thomas Sargent, Harald Uhlig, and Luigi Zingales--and I am sure there many others as well. Regardless of whether one agrees with them or not on the merits of the case, it is hard to dispute that this list is pretty impressive, as judged by the standard objective criteria by which economists judge one another. If any university managed to hire all of them, it would immediately have a top ranked economics department.

So what is one to make of the vice president's statement? As a logical matter, I can think of only four possibilities:

Biden knew what he was saying was false.

Biden was saying what he believed to be true and somehow got this incorrect idea in his head without talking about the issue with the very talented team of economists working for the new administration.

Biden talked to his economic advisers about the issue, and they purposefully misled him into thinking that there was a consensus among economists, even though there isn't.

Biden's advisers were themselves mistaken. They expected an overwhelming consensus of support for their fiscal plans and were surprised at the number of prominent economists on the opposite side the issue.

I have no idea which of these hypotheses is correct. I suspect it is either the first or last. But any one of them should make us uneasy about how well the new administration's economic decision making apparatus is working.

Tuesday, January 20, 2009

Punches Thrown: Krugman versus Mankiw

Krugman: I don’t know what Greg actually believes, he just seems to be approvingly linking to anyone opposed to stimulus, regardless of the quality of their argument.


Mankiw: If Paul really wants to know what I believe, he can read what I have written on the subject....In recent weeks, I have linked...partly to provide a counterpoint to the view disingenuously promoted by some members of the incoming administration that almost all major economists are lined up behind their stimulus plans. As Paul's list of prominent stimulus skeptics documents well, that is simply not the case.

Mankiw by TKO.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008

Mankiw Says Abandon Inflation Fight, Wants 30% Inflation Over Next 10 Years

When inflation takesoff in the not too distant future as a result of current out of control monetary policy (Three month annualized growth in M2 nsa is now at 17%), look no further than Harvard Professor and best selling economic text author, Greg Mankiw, for egging Ben Bernanke on in his money printing ways.

Mankiw wants the Fed to write this in their next press release:

The Committee recognizes that moderate inflation would be desirable under the present circumstances. In particular, the overall level of prices a decade hence should be about 30 percent higher than the price level today. The committee anticipates keeping the stance of monetary policy sufficiently accomodative to achieve that degree of inflation over the coming decade.
Then he writes this nonsense:
The abandonment of "price stability" would be the modern equivalent of Roosevelt's abandoning the gold standard. Of all the things that Roosevelt did to get the economy out of the Depression, jettisoning the gold standard was the most successful.
FDR's "abandonement" of the gold standard was a big scam. It was a government insider scam to help Bernard Baruch (who was advising FDR) and John Maynard Keynes make huge profits during the depression.

First, FDR confiscated privately held gold from all citizens. Baruch and Keynes then scooped up gold stocks. With all U.S. gold now in Fort Knox, FDR instituted a gold buying scheme that pushed the price of gold higher and higher, and resulted in huge insider profits for Keynes and Baruch.

Yeah, FDR's "abandonment" of the gold standard worked well for schemers Baruch and Keynes, for the average American it has created a situation where there is now no restraint on the Fed's ability to print and print more money.

Books could be written about the errors and complications of calling for a 30% decade of inflation. First, it will cause distortions in the economy, in favor of those who get the money first. Second, its true impact can not be measured without knowing what productivity gains are doing to the price level. Further, Mankiw's proposal could very well result in a rock and roll business cycle during the entire decade, and its ultimate inflationary impact could be much more than 30%, depending where we are in the business cycle and what is happening to productivity.

And, there is no upside to 30% inflation! Helluva a recommendation.

Thursday, December 11, 2008

Since The Multiplier Is Being Discussed In Many Lofty Circles, in and around...

...Harvard, The Marginal Revolution blog and, perhaps soon, at the incoming Obama's Council of Economic Advisors, Bob Murphy was alert enough, in a comment to a Tyler Cowen post, to dig up and provide the link to Murray Rothbard's great reductio ad absurdum destruction of the multiplier theory.

Mankiw Jumps on the Head of Keynes and Then Throws Him Under the Bus: Part 3

Greg Mankiw writes:

A key issue facing the new Obama administration is to what extent the economic stimulus should take the form of spending increases versus tax reduction. One way to think about the issue is the size of the fiscal policy multipliers. The multipliers measure bang for the buck--the amount of short-run GDP expansion one gets from a dollar of spending hikes or tax cuts.

So what are these multipliers? In their new blog, Bob Hall and Susan Woodward look at spending increases from World War II and the Korean War and conclude that the government spending multiplier is about one: A dollar of government spending raises GDP by about a dollar. Similarly, the results in Valerie Ramey's research suggest a government spending multiplier of about 1.4. (Valerie does not present her results in multiplier form, but she emails me this translation: "The right column of figure 5A of my paper shows that for a log change of government spending of 1, log GDP rises by 0.28, implying an elasticity of 0.28. To back out the implied multiplier, we can use
the fact that government spending averages around 20% of GDP. This implies a
multiplier of 1.4.")

By contrast, recent research by Christina Romer and David Romer looks at tax changes and concludes that the tax multiplier is about three: A dollar of tax cuts raises GDP by about three dollars. The puzzle is that, taken together, these findings are inconsistent with the conventional Keynesian model. According to that model, taught even in my favorite textbook, spending multipliers necessarily exceed tax multipliers...
And now, from Mankiw, the jump on the head of Keynes (My emphasis):

My advice to Team Obama: Do not be intellectually bound by the textbook Keynesian model. Be prepared to recognize that the world is vastly more complicated than the one we describe in ec 10. In particular, empirical studies that do not impose the restrictions of Keynesian theory suggest that you might get more bang for the buck with tax cuts than spending hikes.

Tuesday, December 9, 2008

Throwing Keynes Under the Bus, Part 2

It has to be done, but who ever thought that Greg Mankiw would cautiously, very cautiously join the movement?:

Larry Kudlow - Which would give a bigger jolt to the economy: lower taxes or bigger government spending?

Greg Mankiw - Well the standard textbook Keynesian theory suggests that if you're interested in increasing aggregate demand, a dollar of government spending is going to generate more demand than a dollar of tax cuts but there's actually some evidence that suggests that's not exactly true....that tax cuts may do more in terms of stimulating private investment than will government spending. And so I think the really[sic] question is what's the government spending the money on and is it things we really need. If it's things we need and are useful that's fine. But if there not things we need it's probably better to use the money for tax cuts.


See it wth your own eyes. Video here.

Sunday, December 7, 2008

Is Mankiw Throwing Keynes Overboard?

I am totally stunned.

Just over a week ago, Harvard Professor Gregory Mankiw wrote this as his lead sentence for a column which appeared in the NYT:

If you were going to turn to only one economist to understand the problems facing the economy, there is little doubt that the economist would be John Maynard Keynes.
He then provided a classic overview of Keynesian thought, especially as it relates to an economic downturn.

He concluded this way:

It is hard to say how successful monetary and fiscal policy will be in avoiding a deep downturn. But as events unfold, you can be sure that policymakers in the Fed and Treasury will be looking at them through a Keynesian lens.

In 1936, Keynes wrote, “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slave of some defunct economist.” In 2008, no defunct economist is more prominent than Keynes himself.
Remarkably, a few days later, on his blog, he begins to diss Keynes (my bold):

The Keynesian model has some clear, practical insights about how to think about fiscal policy during economic downturns. But are those insights true?

One approach to answering this question is to examine the data using the techniques of time-series econometrics without imposing much a priori theory. For monetary policy, there is a large literature that does this; for fiscal policy, the literature is smaller but growing. The results from this exercise, however, do not always confirm the predictions from textbook Keynesian models...

For example, here is the conclusion of Andrew Mountford and Harald Uhlig (a prominent econometrician now at the University of Chicago) in an empirical study called "What are the Effects of Fiscal Policy Shocks?":

Our main results are that a surprise deficit-financed tax cut is the best fiscal policy to stimulate the economy


a deficit[-financed government] spending shock weakly stimulates the economy.


government spending shocks crowd out both residential and non-residential investment without causing interest rates to rise.

These finding are not consistent with standard Keynesian theory, according to which government spending multipliers are larger than tax multipliers and crowding out occurs through increases in interest rates.


An earlier, related paper by Olivier Blanchard and Roberto Perotti called "An Empirical Characterization Of The Dynamic Effects Of Changes In Government Spending And Taxes On Output" reported similar anomalous results...Blanchard, incidentally, is now the chief economist at the IMF...

He continued with the Keynesian diss on CNBC (video here). He pointed out again that tax cuts may better for an economy than government spending during a recession, and also said that monetary policy will be the key to the direction of the economy from here, not fiscal policy.

What's going on? Why the sudden change?

My guess, it has to do with Obama's choice of Christina Romer to head the CEA. She is a former student of Mankiw's (He was also best man at her wedding--her husband is also an economist.) and he has to know she is sharp.

As I wrote on the day Obama named her:

Christina D. Romer, Director of the Council of Economic Advisors

A Keynesian, but actually appears to pay some attention to the money supply as an influence on the business cycle. See here....Best hope for economic sanity out of this group is from Romer.
What about Mankiw's new view on tax cuts as the best method for dealing with a recession?

Here's NYT in its profile of her:
...she has also found that tax increases cause the economy to contract. And her dissertation showed, to the great delight of free-marketers, that the federal government has not gotten much better at stabilizing the economy since the Great Depression.

Romer may already be having have an impact. What else can explain Mankiw's conventional recitation of Keynesian economics in NYT on November 28 and his abrupt change? [Note: Obama named Romer on Nov. 25, Mankiw put an NYT link to his conventional Keynes story on his blog on Nov. 27, so for all practical purposes, it must have been at NYT on Nov. 26 and thus the latest he could have written that column was simultaneous with the naming of Romer.] Read that NYT article closely, there is no talk of any failures in Keynesianism, no talk of tax cuts versus tax spending, in fact he says in the column:

That leaves the government as the demander of last resort. Calls for increased infrastructure spending fit well with Keynesian theory. In principle, every dollar spent by the government could cause national income to increase by more than a dollar if it leads to a more vibrant economy and stimulates spending by consumers and companies. By all reports, that is precisely the plan that the incoming Obama administration has in mind.
His back away from this stance starts after Romer is named.

But, as I also pointed out on my initial snapshot of Romer:

...when you are reaching into Berkeley, of all places, for economic hope, you are obviously not talking about a Milton Friedman protege.
I didn't even want to stretch it and say an Austrian protege. And in the NYT profile of her, they report:

...she has described herself as having “liberal Obama-heavy political views,”
But, it appears that we may have an honest economic broker on our hands, who will clearly state what she sees from the data, Keynes be damned. And Mankiw doesn't seem to want to butt heads with her. Impressive. Keep an eye on this lady.

Tuesday, December 2, 2008

Keynesian Delusions of Grandeur

Greg Mankiw recently wrote that John Maynard Keynes is the most important "defunct economist" to learn from for 2008. Tyler Cowen has piled on by proposing to do a book club reading on his blog for Keynes's General Theory.

Peter Boetteke has written a must read response to these goings on, here.

Saturday, November 8, 2008

Mankiw Forces Obama to Blink?

Obama's nutty, coercive, community service plan, just became voluntary instead of mandatory. Maybe Greg Mankiw delivered the knockout blow.

Monday, October 27, 2008

David Warsh with Big Questions and Big Stories

David Warsh has just published the silver anniversary issue of Economic Principals. I have been reading him from the start, when his column was at the Boston Globe. Twenty-five years ago, his column was the first item I turned to, in the big, thick Sunday Globe. The memories come back, as if it were only yesterday. He is not an Austrian, but he is a damned honest, sincere, interesting and informative writer. We definitely need more people like him (or at least hope, he carries on for another 25 years!)

His silver anniversary issues comes out with rockets blaring and asks these important questions:
How deep has been the opposition between the Federal Reserve Board and the US Treasury Department these last fifteen months? Fed chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson have presented a generally united front. But what goes on behind the scenes? What of their staffs? The sheer opacity of Paulson’s initial plan to buy and hold troubled securities, and the clumsiness with which it was presented, has yet to be explained. What was the process by which it was developed and internally reviewed?

Warsh is on to something here. In early Congressional testimony, Bernanke's view of how the mortgage bail out would proceed was decidedly different from Paulson's. Bernanke testified that the bailout would result in mortgages being bought at "value at maturity". Paulson said they would be bought at discounted market value. The next day in further testimony, Bernanke fell in line with Paulson. Paulson's plan proved a non-starter. Indeed, WSJ reported that it is a dirty little secret that Paulson's Plan to buy up mortgages would not work and indeed would cause more problems for banks, and that is why Treasury shifted to infusing capital directly into banks. And, then, of course, there is the fact that Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley become bank holding companies, and each receive a $10 billion infusion from Treasury. What Just Happened? is the title to Warsh's column, yes indeed.


Warsh also broke wide open Harvard University’s Russia scandal of the 1990s.


Warsh writes:


No column I ever wrote cost more than “The Thing’s a Mess,” the first installment, in 2002, of many columns over the last six years about the collapse in 1997 amid charges of corruption of Harvard University’s USAID-sponsored mission to advise the government of Boris Yeltsin. I knew I was damaging several longstanding relationships with economists whom I admired by calling attention to the details of the US Justice Department’s ultimately successful attempt to recover damages in Boston’s Federal District Court.

Since then I have gotten used to it, and in more than twenty pieces, I have given a pretty good account of how Harvard professor Andrei Shleifer was found to be investing in Russia, along with his wife, deputy, and deputy’s family, in violation of his contractual obligation to provide disinterested advice, and how his close friend and mentor Lawrence Summers sought unsuccessfully to distance himself from the lawsuit, but not from Shleifer, first as Treasury Secretary and then as president of Harvard, as the matter plowed on to its ignominious conclusion. The episode was widely covered in Russia, and became part of the rich lore of Russian resentment
of US policy in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Warsh also writes of the reception he received from the usual suspects about his breakthrough story:

But you would never have a clue that any of this [the Russia episode] had happened from three of the most widely-read economists’ blogs, the Freakonomics site, J. Bradford Delong’s Semi-Daily Journal, or N. Gregory Mankiw’s blog. Why? Because they are economists, and not committed to “without fear or favor” news, though they deliver plenty of interesting tidbits over the course of a week. Besides, Shleifer is on the board of directors of the Becker Center on Price, where Freakonomics’ Steven Levitt teaches. DeLong, who worked under Summers at the Treasury Department, has been Shleifer’s friend since the two were college roommates. Mankiw regularly touts his colleague for a Nobel Prize.
The online edition is free, but the $50 Bulldog edition puts bread, not likely steak, on Warsh's table, and is available by subscripton.

Contra-Cowen

Bob Murphy generally does a good job of rebutting the regular nonsense blogged by Tyler Cowen. However, today, I have to step into the fray, since Cowen touches on topic near and dear to my heart, the business cycle.

In a post titled, Assorted Links, Cowen lists Greg Mankiw's recent column. About the column, he writes,"My favorite Greg Mankiw column so far."

I have a decidedly different take, since in his column Mankiw discusses the current downturn and the Great Depression, yet fails to even mention the possibility of a business cycle theory that could explain the two declines.

Cowen also links to a column by Jeffrey Rogers Hummel. About this column, Cowen writes, "Jeff Hummel blames Bernanke and Paulson for what has happened. I don't agree but we are committed to passing along many different points of view."

Say what?

Hummel writes a detailed blow by blow of Fed money manipulations over recent months. He details what I have been pointing out in real time all summer, that the Fed only started expanding the money supply in late September.

Hummel also does an excellent job of explaining what the recent explosion in the monetary base and Fed credit is all about. (

Although, there are several points of Hummel's that I disagree with, for example, he fails to note that M1 is climbing because of the fear factor, and that the explosion in the monetary base may not, in itself, cause a money supply explosion since the huge Treasury deposit is just sitting there and not entering the system, it is one of the best columns I have read that describes the current monetary situation. Cowen disagrees. He prefers the Mankiw puff piece.

Read the two columns for yourself, and decide who is writing a detailed explanation of the current situation and who is writing puff. Cowen's choice between these two columns is the kind of off center stuff that he regularly posts, which makes it easy to understand how Murphy is able to plant brutal knockout blow after knockout blow on Cowen.

Mankiw's column is here. Hummel's is here.

Sunday, October 26, 2008

President Obama Will Crush Greg Mankiw's Incentive To Do Additional Work

Mankiw does the numbers, here.

Note: Although he details well the heavy additional tax burden he will face during an Obama Administration and that he is thus less likely to work additional hours, he fails to note that this will also impact the standard of living of others, who will fail to benefit from his work. (Or perhaps, deep down, this is a Freudian slip, where he realizes an economist who doesn't have a business cycle theory isn't much of an economist.)

Saturday, October 25, 2008

What Greg Mankiw Is Teaching Our Kids

Harvard economist, and super best selling author of economic texts, Greg Mankiw writes in his NYT column this week about the Great Depression and the possibilities of such occurring now.

Curiously, although he is writing about the Great Depression, he does not once mention the business cycle.

This is as close as he gets:

The Depression began, to a large extent, as a garden-variety downturn.

His reason for the start of the Great Depression:

The 1920s were a boom decade, and as it came to a close the Federal Reserve tried to rein in what might have been called the irrational exuberance of the era.

That's it, a playful use of words first used by the now discredited Alan "I have found a flaw" Greenspan. And, this man, thorough his texts, is teaching our kids!

Of course, there is a business cycle theory and it teaches that the business cycle is caused by money being misdirected by central banks into the capital goods sector during the boom period and then readjusting during the bust part of the cycle.

Indeed, Mankiw describes the facts of this shift away from the capital goods sector during the depression, but somehow does not point out that this is what business cycle theory teaches would occur:

In 1928, the Fed maneuvered to drive up interest rates. So interest-sensitive sectors like construction slowed.

Maybe Mankiw has been reading too much of Paul Krugman's wacky theory that the business cycle is a religion.

From there, Mankiw's article disintegrates even furthee, he writes:

Less successful were various market interventions. According to a study by the economists Harold L. Cole and Lee E. Ohanian, both of the University of California, Los Angeles, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, President Roosevelt made things worse when he encouraged the formation of cartels through the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. Similarly, they argue, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 strengthened organized labor but weakened the recovery by impeding market forces.

This is all very true, but should have been explained in much greater detail, since it is at the heart of understanding how to keep us from experiencing another Great Depression.

Cole and Ohanian contend that without the FDR's economic programs, such as the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) the National Labor Relations Board, the Depression would have ended in 1936 instead of the year when they believe the slump actually ended: 1943!

NIRA's labor provisions were strengthened in the National Relations Act, signed into law in 1935. As union membership doubled, so did labor's bargaining power, rising from 14 million strike days in 1936 to about 28 million in 1937. LABOR STRIKES IN THE MIDDLE OF A DEPRESSION! By 1939 wages in protected industries remained 24 percent to 33 percent above where they should have been, based on 1929 figures, Cole and Ohanian calculate. Unemployment persisted because of these artificially high wages. By 1939 the U.S. unemployment rate was 17.2 percent, down somewhat from its 1933 peak of 24.9 percent but still very high.

"The fact that the Depression dragged on for years convinced generations of economists and policy-makers that capitalism could not be trusted to recover from depressions and that significant government intervention was required to achieve good outcomes," Cole said. "Ironically, our work shows that the recovery would have been very rapid had the government not intervened."

Mankiw after failing to make clear the details of the Cole and Ohanian research, in other than the most superficial fashion, then goes on with nonsense talk about the failures of the economic profession:

In other words, even if another Depression were around the corner, you shouldn’t expect much advance warning from the economics profession.

Well, I guess this is true if you don't understand the business cycle. But, if you do understand the business cycle and watch money supply, the problems in the economy are not that difficult to spot. See here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here. Or to get the full picture years in advance, see here.

As for the future, David Sirota sounds the warning, without realizing it :

..if Obama wins, he will have as powerful an economic mandate as FDR received in the 1932 landslide election, because the voting public will be expecting - no, demanding - far-reaching economic change.

Economist Paul H. Rubin explains what this means:

Unlike FDR, Mr. Obama will not have to create the mechanisms government uses to interfere with the economy before imposing his policies. FDR had to get the Supreme Court to overturn a century's worth of precedents limiting the power of government before he could use the Constitution's commerce clause, among other things, to increase government control of the economy. Mr. Obama will have no such problem.

FDR also had to create agencies to implement regulations. Today, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Board (both created in the 1930s) as well as the Environmental Protection Agency and others created later are in place. Increasing their power will be easier than creating them from scratch...

Democrats draw their political power from trial lawyers, unions, government bureaucrats, environmentalists, and, perhaps, my liberal colleagues in academia. All of these voting blocs seem to favor a larger, more intrusive government. If things proceed as they now appear likely to, we can expect major changes in policies that benefit these groups.

And, Mankiw, plays subtle with this danger, at best, in his NYT column. He does not mention an Obama presidency instituting "economic change" that could very well cause the next Great Depression.

The next time I run into a college student, or college graduate that tells me economics was boring in class, I'm going to tell them that the professor that writes those college texts can't even predict a recession or depression, and any professor that uses his textbooks is drinking mainstream kool aid that hides the true facts of what is going on. They want to keep you bored and uninformed, and Mankiw is the best at doing it, I'm going to tell them. And then, I am going to direct them to EPJ which does discuss the business cycle and is obviously not boring.

Monday, October 6, 2008

Blame The Current Crisis On Greg Mankiw?

It's obvious that most of the players caught up in the current Wall Street meltdown don't have a clue about business cycle theory and an understanding about how it would impact their business.

But it doesn't stop with business leaders. We have frequently commented on the fact that Alan Greenspan did not appear to have any type of theory of the business cycle. A peculiar situation for a one time Federal Reserve chairman. (Read his autobiography, not a word about business cycle theory) The same goes for Warren Buffett. He doesn't ever seem to mention business cycle theory. Who's to blame for this vacuum in understanding of the business cycle? How about the authors of introductory economic textbooks, such as Greg Mankiw, the current leader among authors of best selling economic texts .

Davd Warsh comments:

How peculiar is it that the leading introductory economics texts scarcely mention the cycles of manias, panics and crashes that have been a familiar feature of global capitalism since its emergence in the seventeenth century?

No propensity to bubble or bail is among the ten big ideas that govern economics in N. Gregory Mankiw’s text, for example. Ben Bernanke, in the book he wrote with Robert Frank before he became chairman of the Fed, discusses the 1990s banking crisis in Japan, the dot.com episode in the US and the Argentine collapse in 2001, along with the Great Depression, on which he is an expert; he even mentions in passing the “reckless lending” that led to the US savings and loan crisis in the 1980s: but the tendency to repeated financial crises is not remarked, and neither “bubble” nor “credit crunch” appear in the glossary...

Even Karl Case and Ray Fair don’t make much of a case for the perennial nature of crises (at least in my edition), though Case, of Wellesley College, and his colleague Robert Shiller, of Yale University, have played a prescient and central role in the analysis of the real estate crash.
When it comes to the business cycle, you really have to study it on your own. A good place to start is Roger Garrison's The Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle, which also does a good job of explaining why mainstream economists don't understand the business cycle.