The Friedman dislike for the great Ludwig von Mises and gold really becomes clear in this interview:
Mises was for the gold standard. [Friedrich] Hayek went around and around the bush on that...But he was not a gold nut like von Mises was.-RW
Mises was for the gold standard. [Friedrich] Hayek went around and around the bush on that...But he was not a gold nut like von Mises was.-RW
Capitalism is essentially a system of mass production for the satisfaction of the needs of the masses. It pours a horn of plenty upon the common man. It has raised the average standard of living to a height never dreamed of in earlier ages. It has made accessible to millions of people enjoyments which a few generations ago were only within the reach of a small élite.-The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality,
CHAPTER 2On the Measurement of Value1 The Immeasurability of Subjective Use-ValuesAlthough it is usual to speak of money as a measure of value and
prices, the notion is entirely fallacious. So long as the subjective
theory of value is accepted, this question of measurement cannot arise.
In the older political economy, the search for a principle governing the
measurement of value was to a certain extent justifiable. If, in
accordance with an objective theory of value, the possibility of an
objective concept of commodity values is accepted, and exchange is
regarded as the reciprocal surrender of equivalent goods, then the
conclusion necessarily follows that exchange transactions must be
preceded by measurement of the quantity of value contained in each of
the objects that are to be exchanged. And it is then an obvious step to
regard money as the measure of value.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”
Last week Mises Institute senior fellow David Gordon reviewed Money, the book released last summer by Steve Forbes and Elizabeth Ames. Gordon described it as “odd” in the sense that he disagreed with how the authors have chosen to define money. What struck this writer as odd is that in lightly attacking Forbes and Ames, Gordon only succeeded insofar as he perhaps unintentionally revealed a strong disagreement about money with the intellectual father of the Institute which employs him, Ludwig von Mises.
Gordon has a problem with the Forbes and Ames assertion that money is merely a measure meant to facilitate exchange. Notable here is that the authors are simply stating what’s obvious, something that surely predates even Adam Smith (“the sole use of money is to circulate consumable goods”), that money isn’t wealth. It’s what we use to exchange actual wealth.So what is this so-called evidence that Mises disagreed with Gordon's point on money as a measure of value.. Tamny says:
As Mises wrote in Human Action, “One must disregard the intermediary role played by money in order to realize that what is ultimately exchanged is always economic goods of the first order against other such goods. Money is nothing but a medium of personal exchange (my emphasis).” In short, Mises saw money just as Forbes and Ames do, as a measure that fosters the exchange of actual economic goods.Say what? Again, Tamny either has a reading comprehension problem or is running his stuff through a minor league distortion machine. Money being a medium of personal exchange is not the same as it being a measure to facilitate exchange.
Although it is usual to speak of money as a measure of value and prices, the notion is entirely fallacious.
But the characteristic feature of the youth movement was that they had neither new ideas nor plans. They called their action the youth movement precisely because they lacked any program which they could use to give a name to their endeavors. In fact they espoused entirely the program of their parents. They did not oppose the trend toward government omnipotence and bureaucratization.(htRyanUnderwood)
And what is a "dollar"? A dollar is presently a credit instrument, specifically, a credit instrument known as a Federal Reserve Note. This is what Mises defines as "credit money", and not, as is commonly assumed, "fiat money", nor is it "commodity money", as was the case with the historical dollar, which was defined in 1792 as 24.056 grams of silver.Vox Day states this without reference because he would never be able to find such a reference in the writing of Mises.
While I'm tempted to cut Wenzel some slack due to his support of Ron Paul, that is unfortunately not my idiom. So, to end my response with all the tender mercy of Van Helsing driving home a stake, I shall conclude by quoting Ludwig von Mises:What this has to do with the debate, I'm not sure. To me it sounds terribly misleading, as though Mises is making the claim that a Federal Reserve note is a credit instrument that is currently circulating. In fact, what Mises was doing at that point in his discussion was stating that many things have been used as money. In the sentence above the quote that Vox Day selected, Mises refers to the time when "An ox or a sack of corn" were used as money.
In a developed monetary system, on the other hand, we find commodity money, of which large quantities remain constantly in circulation and are never consumed or used in industry; credit money, whose foundation, the claim to payment, is never made use of;* and possibly even fiat money, which has no use at all except as money.
- The Theory of Money and Credit, p. 103 (1953)
To regard note-holders or owners of current accounts as granters of credit is to fail to recognize the meaning of a credit transaction. To treat both notes and bills of exchange in general (that is, not merely sight bills) as "credit instruments" alike is to renounce all hope of getting to the heart of the matter.There it is, Mises speaking from the grave directly to Vox Day about his crazed thinking that notes should be treated as "credit instruments." As Mises says, the Vox Day view renounces "all hope of getting to the heart of the matter."
from: | Bill Still thesecretofoz@gmail.com | ||
sender-time: | Sent at 1:13 PM (GMT-05:00). Current time there: 1:39 PM. ✆ | ||
to: | rw@economicpolicyjournal.com | ||
date: | Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 1:13 PM | ||
subject: | Ludwig Ahhh, I get it now. This from your post: "Richard Ebeling: On Mises, Central Planning ....." "We discussed why Ludwig von Mises was a great economist, central planning ...." |
Need to prove something you already believe? Statistics are easy: All you need are two graphs and a leading question.
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Click on chart for larger view. |
There are, in the field of economics, no constant relations, and consequently no measurement is possible. If a statistician determines that a rise of 10 percent in the supply of potatoes in Atlantis at a definite time was followed by a fall of 8 percent in the price, he does not establish anything about what happened or may happen with a change in the supply of potatoes in another country or in another time. He has not "measured" the "elasticity of demand" of potatoes. He has established a unique individual historical fact. No intelligent man can doubt that the behavior of men with regard to potatoes and every other commodity is variable. Different individuals value the same things in a different way, and valuations change with the same individuals with changing conditions. . . .
The impracticability of measurement is not due to the lack of technical methods for the establishment of measure. It is due to the absence of constant relations. . . . Economics is not, as . . . positivists repeat again and again, backward because it is not "quantitative." It is not quantitative and does not measure because there are no constants. Statistical figures referring to economic events are historical data. They tell us what happened in a nonrepeatable historical case. Physical events can be interpreted on the ground of our knowledge concerning constant relations established by experiments. Historical events are not open to such an interpretation. . . .
Experience of economic history is always experience of complex phenomena. It can never convey knowledge of the kind the experimenter abstracts from a laboratory experiment. Statistics is a method for the presentation of historical facts. . . . The statistics of prices is economic history. The insight that, ceteris paribus, an increase in demand must result in an increase in prices is not derived from experience. Nobody ever was or ever will be in a position to observe a change in one of the market data ceteris paribus. There is no such thing as quantitative economics. All economic quantities we know about are data of economic history. . . . Nobody is so bold as to maintain that a rise of A percent in the supply of any commodity must always – in every country and at any time – result in a fall of B percent in price. But as no quantitative economist ever ventured to define precisely on the ground of statistical experience the special conditions producing a definite deviation from the ratio A:B, the futility of his endeavors is manifest.
Game theory can be fun and interesting. It’s central to current mainstream research in industrial organization and corporate strategy. It’s been taught to a generation of MBA students. Unfortunately, according to FastCompany, nobody in business actually uses it.In his review, Ebeling writes:
...what is less well known is that Morgenstern was a prominent member of the Austrian School of Economics before the Second World War.As a side note, Ebeling tells us in his review that he took a course with Morgenstern and he is clearly shocked by some of the revelations about Morgenstern . See Ebeling's full review, here.
His first book was on Economic Forecasting (1928), which unfortunately has never been translated into English. He presented a biting and insightful analysis as to why quantitative models would never be able to successfully predict the economic future. His three fundamental arguments were (1) that historical events are too unique and interdependently complex to be reducible to statistical probability analysis; (2) any public forecast easily will result in people taking the forecast into consideration, and therefore acting in ways different than what the forecast presumed; and (3) how individuals act is dependent on their expectations of how they expect others to act, and understanding and interpreting people’s subjective meanings and intentions is not readily reducible to strictly quantitative categories and classifications for statistical study...
Leonard traces out the development of Morgenstern’s thinking in the 1920s and 1930a under the influence of Austrian Economists such as Ludwig von Mises and Hans Mayer, and his friendship with Karl Menger, Jr., the son of the founder of the Austrian School.
But what he also brings out is how Morgenstern increasingly turned against his “Austrian” roots...
Even worse, after 1934, with Hayek now a professor at the London School of Economics, and Mises teaching in Geneva, Switzerland, Morgenstern attempted to portray himself as the “leader” of the Austrian School in an Austria that was now a fascist-type authoritarian dictatorship. He worked as a senior advisor to the Austrian government, often offering policy advice far removed from a free market perspective...
In addition, Leonard points out that Morgenstern’s diary from this period is sprinkled with often heavily anti-Semitic sentiments, in spite of the fact that many of the members of the Austrian School at this time were Jewish (including Mises), and who had been among those encouraging and supportive of his own work and professional advancement.
...now comes Paul Krugman with his sometimes-echo Brad Delong (or is it vice versa?). Krugman thinks that Hayek was not an important “macro” economist; certainly not the rival or alternative to Keynes, either in the 1930s or today. In fact, Hayek embarrassed himself with his cycle and capital theory. Hayek’s brilliance as a monetary theorist (aka “macroeconomist”) is a figment of the political imaginations of those who love him for his “political” book, The Road to Serfdom.
Until just a little while ago, I thought it best to ignore the latest Krugmanic outburst, especially since there are excellent posts at Marginal Revolution and Café Hayek, just to mention two. And yet the recent obsession Krugman has with Hayek (and lately the obsession DeLong has with Mises) means that some nerve has been touched. Of course, it might simply be that Krugman needs material for his blogs and columns.
However, I think the real issue is this. Hayek’s approach attacks, root-and-branch, the macroeconomic way of thinking. It is not simply a challenge to a particular theory of the determinants of mass unemployment, inflation, business cycles and the like. Hayek is not accepting the rules of the game or the parameters of the sub-discipline of modern macroeconomics. Hayek does not want to argue that the government expenditure multiplier is 0.5 instead of 2.0, for example. He does not want to discuss just how much fiscal stimulus should be undertaken and what form it should assume.
In short, he does not want to focus on aggregate spending and aggregate consequences. Hayek’s approach says: Let us pierce the veil of aggregates and look at the distortive effects on relative prices and relative output produced by boom-time credit expansions. Let us look at the distortive effects that booms leave us as we work our way through a recession. Let us concentrate on sustainable lines of expenditure both during the boom and during the road out from the bust.
Suffice it to say this greatly erodes the intellectual capital of a field of economics – although one not noted for its successes. It mocks the claim that Keynes was a true revolutionary in economic thought. It opens the possibility that he was muddled, inconsistent and unaware of the contributions to monetary and business cycle theory made by the “classical economists” on the eve of the General Theory.
It also opens the possibility that Keynes’s economics was catapulted into prominence not so much by its technical or scientific excellence but the compatibility of its policy nostrums with the temper of the times.